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Abstract 
The current economic policy discussion on financial integration in the European Union 
concentrates on cross-border mergers. We study the impact of cross-border lending in a 
theoretical model where banks acquire either hard or soft information on borrowing firms 
and predict that the closer firms are to the border the more likely banks are to offer them 
cross-border loans. This hypothesis is confirmed in the ifo Business Climate Survey that 
reports the perceptions of German firms on banks’ lending behavior between 2003 and 
2006. In contrast to the policy of harmonization, differences in bank regulations may 
provide incentives for cross-border lending. Thus, we show that financial integration may 
take place from the bottom up. 
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1. Introduction  
In Europe, integration of the banking market has been expected for many years but so 
far little progress has occurred in this respect (ECB, 2007). Integration in credit markets 
happens through cross-border lending or foreign bank entry, through either greenfield 
investment or acquisition. For Europe, cross-border mergers are expected to drive 
financial integration. Cross-border mergers often mean that the distance between 
customers and their banks will increase, and information problems will become more 
severe. From the literature on distance and lending we know that (both physical and 
functional) distance crucially influences the financing conditions of firms. 
Consequently, cross-border mergers may render it more difficult for informationally 
opaque firms, in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to get access 
to loans (Barros et al., 2005).  
Cross-border lending as a means of integration is often neglected in this debate. 
However, we could expect that it has a positive effect on access to loans for SMEs. 
Before the foreign bank lends cross-border, firms are deprived of access to loans from 
banks that are close but in another country (see the literature on border effects).
1
 Thus, 
cross-border lending may be especially beneficial for SMEs for whom distance is 
particularly relevant. Therefore, we want to know how firms benefit from integration 
through cross-border lending. What is the role of distance in cross-border lending?  
To answer these questions, we derive in the first part of the paper a theoretical 
model in which a German and an Austrian bank compete on the credit market for 
German firms. Due to regulatory requirements, the German bank must use hard 
information about the firm’s creditworthiness. While hard information is costly, its 
quality is independent of the distance to firms. By contrast, the Austrian bank can 
decide whether to use hard information after making some additional investment or to 
rely on soft information. However, the quality of soft information decreases in the 
distance between bank and firm.  
                                                 
1 Border effects in trade are intensively discussed in literature (see the seminal paper McCallum, 1995). 
Borders reduce trade between industrialized countries by 20 to 50 per cent (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003). Similar effects are documented for portfolio holdings (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).  
2 
We show that the Austrian bank decides to use costless soft information about 
German firms. The reason is that if the Austrian bank used hard information as well, 
competition between the German and the Austrian bank would drive banks profits to 
zero. This would not allow the Austrian bank to recover the fixed costs it had to incur to 
use hard information on German firms. Given this choice, the Austrian bank is informed 
less than the German bank, and it faces an adverse selection problem because all non-
creditworthy firms apply there. As a result, with positive probability the Austrian bank 
decides against making loans offers to German firms at all. The further away German 
firms are from the Austrian border the higher is the probability that the Austrian bank 
decides against offering loans to them at all.  
In the second part of the paper, we study the cross-border lending at the German-
Austrian border where Austrian banks started to grant loans to German firms in 2004. 
This phenomenon became widely known because German banks complained about 
increasing competition from Austrian banks. We use a unique dataset, the ifo Business 
Climate Survey, in which firms assess the supply of bank loans. Our empirical 
observation yields two main results. First, German firms benefit from cross-border 
lending by having better access to credit. Second, distance also matters in cross-border 
lending. The further away a German firm is to the Austrian border, the less likely it is to 
perceive the banks’ lending behavior as accommodating. Up to a distance of 100 
kilometers, an increase in distance by ten kilometers from a potential Austrian lender 
decreases the probability that the firms see the credit supply as accommodating by 0.52 
percentage points.  
Our paper is related to two strands in the literature: the role of distance in lending 
and financial market integration. In their seminal paper, Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
document that the physical distance between borrower and bank in the U.S. has 
increased significantly during the last decades and attribute this development to changes 
in information technology.
2
 The idea is that, through better information processing 
systems, banks can get access to more hard (and verifiable) information, and thus the 
need to collect soft information decreases. Soft information consists of all the pieces of 
                                                 
2 Petersen and Rajan (2002) use survey data. Other studies are based on information about individual 
loans (for instance, De Young et al., 2007). Independent of the data used, the results remain the same. 
3 
information a bank gains through a business relationship with or through proximity to a 
firm (Stein, 2002). But soft information is more difficult to process over distance 
(Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). This relationship between distance and the availability 
of soft information explains why price discrimination exists, as documented by Degryse 
and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2007). Both studies find that as the 
distance between a borrower and his bank increases, the interest rate on loans decreases, 
but as distance between the borrower and the competing bank increases, the interest rate 
increases. These results are due to the hold-up problem a borrower faces by its 
incumbent bank. Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) also show that distance not only 
influences the loan rate but also the availability of loans. The closer a borrower is to his 
bank, the more likely he is to get an offer from it but the less likely it is that the 
competing bank makes an offer.
3
 All these papers study distance between a borrower 
and a bank operating in a single country. In contrast, we investigate the role of distance 
in cross-border lending.
4
  
Our model is most closely related to the model on distance in lending by Hauswald 
and Marquez (2006). In their model, one bank uses a screening technology that gives an 
imperfect signal, and the quality of the signal decreases in the distance between bank 
and firm. The other bank offers a pooling contract. As a result, there exists an 
asymmetric information problem between banks. The informed bank does not offer 
loans to firms with a bad signal. They, however, can apply at the uninformed bank. 
Since the quality of the signal is better, the closer a firm is to the bank, the worse is the 
pool of firms applying at the uninformed bank. In order to avoid making losses, the 
uninformed bank may decide not to offer a loan at all to firms from a particular location. 
It can be shown that the probability that the uninformed bank makes a loan increases in 
the distance between the informed bank and the firm. Due to the fact that the screening 
technology is imperfect and that one bank does not screen at all, the model predicts that 
                                                 
3 Evidence from Italy confirms that a borrower’s financing constraint increases in functional distance, 
meaning the distance between a borrower and a bank’s location where decisions about loans are taken 
(Alessandrini et al., 2006). 
4 Somewhat in between these studies and ours is Huang (2008) who studies the impact of branching 
deregulation in the U.S. Although the data is for one country, the regulatory environment differs between 
states. 
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the distance between the uninformed bank and the firm does not matter. In our model by 
contrast, banks rely on the two different types of information, hard and soft, so that none 
of them is fully agnostic about the creditworthiness of its borrowers. 
There is a huge literature about financial integration, in particular about Europe. 
Several reports try to quantify the degree of integration by measuring interest rate 
convergence, cross-border capital flows, or mergers.
5
 The common conclusion is that 
the credit market is the least integrated market. This applies, in particular, to loans for 
SMEs, while there is one (European) market for loans to big and transparent (and 
mostly multinational) corporations. The other common view is that mergers will drive 
integration. Mostly focusing on domestic mergers, it is shown that such an event 
changes the loan policy of the new bank and renders it more difficult for SMEs to get 
access to finance (Sapienza, 2002; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2007).
6
 However, the 
effect vanishes over time as other banks enter the market to serve those firms which fall 
out of the target market of the merged institution (Berger et al., 1998). To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies on the effect of cross-border lending.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents some stylized facts on the 
German banking sector. In section 3, we set up a theoretical model of competition 
between banks that use different types of information, while testable hypotheses are 
derived in Section 4. We describe the data used in section 5. The relationship between 
cross-border lending and the firm’s perception of the banks’ lending behavior are tested 
empirically in section 6. Section 7 presents a threshold analysis between distance and 
the lending behavior of banks as perceived by the firms as a part of our robustness 
analysis. We conclude in section 8. 
 
2.  Banking Sector in Germany  
Before we set up the theoretical model and derive testable hypotheses, we want to 
describe some particular characteristics of the German banking system. It is a three 
                                                 
5 These surveys include Baele et al. (2004), Barros et al. (2005), Dermine (2006), ECB (2007), and 
Kleimeier and Sander (2007). 
6 Sapienza’s (2002) analysis is based on information about individual loan contracts from Italy. In 
contrast, Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) do not confirm the result using survey data from the US.  
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pillar system, consisting of private commercial banks, cooperative banks, and public 
banks. If all market segments are considered, each of these has about the same market 
share (Brunner et al., 2004; Krahnen und Schmidt, 2004). However, the big commercial 
banks play only a limited role in financing SMEs. With respect to corporate loans, in 
2005 public banks (most importantly “Sparkassen”, i.e. saving banks owned by 
communities) provided 61 percent, followed by cooperative banks 
(“Genossenschaftsbanken”, usually “Raiffeisenbanken”) with 27 percent and private 
commercial banks with 12 percent (Bundesbank, 2007). Savings banks and cooperative 
banks have very similar attitudes towards financing SMEs (Prantl et al., 2006). Both 
cooperative and savings banks operate on a regional principle, meaning that they 
finance firms in their own “district” but hardly any firms located elsewhere. Given the 
results from the literature on distance and lending, this could be the result of an 
optimization of the bank’s lending area. Usually, however, this restriction is even more 
severe as savings and cooperative banks are not allowed to lend outside their 
community.  
During the period analyzed, Germany faced a dramatic decrease in financial 
intermediation. The aggregate volume of credit to the private sector relative to GDP in 
Germany contracted by about 25 percent between 2001 and 2006 (Kunkel, 2007). In 
particular, it became very difficult for SMEs to receive loans during this period. 
According to a Eurobarometer published by the European Commission in October 2005, 
73% of German SMEs consider their financing situation as sufficient, but 20% of them 
look for easier access to means of financing. To put these figures into perspective, the 
share of SMEs for EU15 (Austria) that consider their financing situation as sufficient is 
77% (85%) and those that look for easier access to finance is 14% (11%) 
(Eurobarometer, 2005). A possible, and often heard, explanation for why banks were 
reluctant to lend is that they adjusted the measurement of risk in their credit evaluation 
to the Basel II standards. Other reasons were the economic downturn and the significant 
share of problem loans in the portfolio of German banks (Westermann, 2007). 
An interesting phenomenon was observed during this period. German firms located 
close to the Austrian border were granted loans across the border by Austrian banks. 
One reason might be that the regulation of banks in Austria was different with respect to 
the implementation of the Basel II standards. A survey conducted between December 
6 
2005 and February 2006 shows that particularly smaller banks and regional banks in 
Austria have not yet implemented risk-adjusted pricing as suggested by the Basel II 
framework (Jäger and Redak, 2006).  
Besides these differences of “regulation in action” there were also differences in the 
“regulation on the books” between the countries. In both countries, debtors must 
provide information, such as financial statements, about their economic situation so that 
the supervisory authority can verify the bank’s creditworthiness test. In Germany, this 
information had to be provided for loans exceeding EUR 250,000 (according to § 18 
Kreditwesengesetz).
7
 In Austria, however, the threshold value for providing this 
information was, and still is, EUR 750,000 (according to Art. 27 Bankwesengesetz). As 
a reaction to this asymmetry, the German legislation increased the threshold value to 
EUR 750,000 in May 2005 (Economist, 2005). The adjustment of the threshold value in 
Germany is in line with the Lamfalussy approach which intends to reduce the difference 
in financial regulation and supervision. Although these different threshold values 
exemplify the difference in regulation very well, more fundamental differences in the 
implementation of regulation still prevail. 
Moreover, Austria has also actively promoted SME financing in various areas. In 
2005, for example, a major Austrian bank, Bank Austria Creditanstalt (BACA), 
received a loan of EUR 200 million from the European Investment Bank to support 
regional loans and loans to SMEs, including in other countries where BACA operates 
(thus also encompassing Southern Germany). Finally, Austrian banks offer financing 
packages that differ from those of German banks and not infrequently include foreign 
currency loans.
8
 
                                                 
7 This requirement could be avoided if the debtor pledges a sufficient amount of collateral. 
8 Recently, Austrian banks have specialized in loan issues in foreign currencies (see Tzanninis, 2005). 
Although these loans (issued mainly in Swiss francs and Japanese yen) are associated with significantly 
higher risk exposure, they may be attractive for selected German companies as they are generally 
available with comparably lower expected interest rates. OeNB (2007) argues that the developments have 
contributed to the good performance of Austrian banks up to now. 
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3. Model of Cross-Border Lending 
We capture the situation described above in the following model. There exists a 
continuum of firms, the number of which is normalized to 1. They are distributed 
uniformly on a Hotelling line of length 1. Firms want to undertake an investment project 
that costs I. However, they do not have the funds to finance the projects themselves and 
therefore need to finance the investment with credit. We have two types of firms: good 
firms that will be successful with probability p and bad firms that will always fail. If 
successful, a firm generates a return of X. If it fails, the return is 0. We assume that the 
expected profit of a good project is positive, i.e. pX-I > 0. The share of good firms in 
the population is Į. We restrict attention to parameter values such that the average 
profitability of all projects is positive, i.e. ĮpX-I > 0.  
The firm can demand a loan from either a German bank or an Austrian bank. The 
two banks are located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line. Banks can observe a 
firm’s location but not its creditworthiness. Thus, banks make their offers contingent on 
the firm’s location; they price-discriminate. Banks demand repayments R if a firm is 
successful, where R
G
 denotes the repayment of a German bank and R
A
 the repayment of 
an Austrian bank. The two banks have the same costs of refinancing which we 
normalize to zero.
9
  
Banks can gather two different types of information, hard and soft. They get hard 
and verifiable information, for instance, from the firm’s balance sheet, by conducting a 
creditworthiness test. We capture screening as a procedure that causes costs of c but 
gives the bank a perfect signal about the firm’s type. Alternatively, they can rely on soft 
information which consists of insights gained during the personal interaction of the loan 
officer with the firm’s manager. The bank receives a signal that reveals the firm’s type 
correctly with probability s, .1ds 10 However, it becomes more difficult for the banker 
to acquire and deal with soft information the further away a borrower is. The quality of 
the signal s decreases in the distance d between the firm and the bank, i.e. 0
)( w
d
ds
.  
                                                 
9 The interbank lending rates in Germany and Austria are indeed the same. 
10 Note that, for , the signal is uninformative and will not be used by the bank. 5.0s ื
8 
We will focus on firms that demand loans of a size for which regulation differs 
between Germany and Austria. Due to regulatory requirements, the German bank must 
screen its applicants. The idea is that the bank generates hard and verifiable information 
that can be communicated to the regulator. Therefore the costs of generating this 
information do not depend on the distance between firm and bank. The Austrian bank is 
not forced to screen. It receives an imperfect signal about a firm’s creditworthiness. But 
by investing K it can implement the technology that generates hard and verifiable 
information on German firms. 
The timing of events is as follows. In the first stage, the Austrian bank decides 
whether to use hard or soft information for the credit evaluation. In the second stage, 
banks simultaneously decide whether or not to offer contracts (and this offer is binding) 
and announce the repayments they require from the applicant. At the third stage, firms 
decide where to submit a credit proposal. Submitting a credit proposal is binding in the 
sense that the firm must take the loan when it receives a positive signal. Then banks 
receive signals about the firm’s creditworthiness and decide which firm they actually 
offer a loan. Finally, payoffs are realized.  
We solve the game through backward induction and start by analyzing the bank’s 
decision to grant a loan. We know that the German bank uses hard information and 
suppose that the Austrian bank relies on soft information. The German bank will finance 
only good firms because financing bad firms yields a loss. Likewise, the Austrian bank 
only offers loans to firms with a positive signal.  
Next, we study the firm’s decision at which bank to apply. Bad firms always have 
an incentive to apply at the Austrian bank because they know that the Austrian bank is 
wrong with positive probability whereas they will never get a loan from the German 
bank. When good firms submit their credit proposal they take into account that they do 
not get a loan with certainty from the Austrian bank. Therefore, a good firm will be 
indifferent between applying for a loan at a German or at an Austrian bank when 
     AD RXpdsRXp    (1) 
Both banks need certain minimum repayments to break even. These repayments are 
denoted by 
G
R  and 
A
R , respectively. If both banks demand their minimum repayment, 
9 
the firm has a higher repayment with the loan from the Austrian bank if 
      IIpXscc DDD -1-
-1
ˆ   . We characterize the equilibrium in proposition 1:  
 
Proposition 1: Suppose the Austrian bank uses soft information. Contingent on the 
location of the firm which determines s, banks make the following offers and the get the 
following profit per customer: 
(1) If the Austrian bank has a cost advantage, i.e. cˆc > , an equilibrium in pure 
strategies exists. The German bank offers GR  and makes ȆG=0. The Austrian bank 
offers the equivalent of 
G
R  and makes       cssIspXA DDDD  3 -12-1-1- . 
(2) If the German bank has a cost advantage, i.e. cc ˆd , an equilibrium in mixed 
strategies exists. The German bank offers repayments in the range between the 
equivalent of 
A
R  and X according to the cumulative density function 
     IpRs
Is
RF G
-
-1-1
-1 D
D  and demands X with probability . It makes  XF G-1
      cssIXspG DDDD --1-1-1  3 . The Austrian bank offers repayments in the 
interval ),[ XR
A
 according to the cumulative density function 
       cIpR
cIsXsp
RF A
--
--11-2--1
-1 D
DDD  and does not offer loans with probability  
. It makes Ȇ XF A-1 A=0. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
If the Austrian bank has a cost advantage (which happens if the quality of the 
imperfect signal is high), the Austrian bank demands the equivalent of 
G
R . The German 
bank offers 
G
R  where it makes zero expected profits by financing good firms, taking 
into account that it has to screen them and – given they have a positive signal – they are 
obliged to take the loan. Therefore, the German bank is indifferent between offering this 
repayment and not offering loans at all. The Austrian bank can, by matching this rate, 
attract good firms (in addition to the bad firms that always apply).  
10 
If the German bank has a cost advantage, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies 
because the German bank has superior information. Suppose the German bank 
undercuts the offer of the Austrian bank, which demands 
A
R . Then, the Austrian bank 
would make an expected loss with this repayment because the bad firms would still 
apply. Therefore, the Austrian bank decides to make no offers to German firms. 
However, given that the Austrian bank does not offer a loan, the German bank could ask 
the highest repayment possible, X. As a result, the Austrian bank makes zero expected 
profits because it stays out of the credit market with positive probability. Due to the 
better information the German bank possesses through the creditworthiness test, it 
makes a positive expected profit.  
Finally, we study the decision of the Austrian bank on which type of information to 
use and state the result in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: The Austrian bank does not invest into screening and uses soft 
information. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
The Austrian bank does not have an incentive to screen. This is obvious in the case 
where the Austrian bank has a cost advantage. In the other case, the reason is that there 
would be perfect competition if both banks used hard information. This would drive 
profits in the credit market game down to zero. Thus, the Austrian bank could not 
recover the fixed costs K for implementing the credit evaluation technique that uses 
hard information on German firms.
11
 
Ultimately, we are interested in the impact of distance on lending. Comparative 
statics yield the following interesting result: 
 
                                                 
11 Indeed, Austrian banks do rely on soft information. One of the regional banks active in cross-border 
lending emphasizes how important qualitative factors (beside quantitative factors) are for evaluating the 
creditworthiness (Oberbank, 2008). 
11 
Proposition 3: The closer a firm is located to the Austrian border, the higher is the 
probability that both banks offer loans. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Here, we focus on the probability F
i
(RdX), i=G, A, that banks offer loans at all (stage 2) 
because we want to study the lending policy of banks in general. This means we do not 
study the probability that an individual firm gets a loan. For the German bank the 
probability that it offers loans to firms at a particular location does not depend on the 
distance between bank and firm.  
The Austrian bank finances both good firms and also some bad firms because its 
signal is imperfect. Since the Austrian bank has better information about firms that are 
closer to Austria, it faces less risk in financing these firms. The further away from the 
border firms are located, the less soft information the Austrian bank has about them and 
the less informative is the signal. Thus, the bank offers loans to fewer good firms and 
more bad firms as distance increases. This implies that the bank faces the risk of ending 
up with a relatively high share of bad firms in its portfolio. Thus, the Austrian bank will 
decide to offer a loan to the more distant borrowers with a lower probability. 
Accordingly, the behavior of the Austrian bank drives the result in Proposition 3.  
Here, we also have to take into account the particular situation of the German 
banking system. Due to the regional principal, savings and cooperative banks operate in 
their own district and are not allowed to offer loans to firms outside this. In terms of our 
model, this could be captured as follows: along the Hotelling line there are several 
banks. Each of these banks competes with the Austrian bank that is located at one end 
of the Hotelling line (border), but German banks do not compete with each other. 
Proposition 3 implies that the bigger the distance between a German and Austrian bank, 
the less precise the Austrian bank’s signal about the creditworthiness of a firm and the 
lower the probability that the Austrian bank offers loans to firms at that location at all. 
 
12 
Figure 1: Distance and Probability that Banks offer Loans  
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The probability that the German and the Austrian banks offer loans at all, i.e. 
F
i
(RdX), i=G, A, is depicted in Figure 1 (for a linear relationship between distance and 
the quality of the signal). Since the German bank uses hard information, the distance 
between bank and firm no longer matters for the probability that the bank makes an 
offer. Often there will be two German banks (a savings bank and a cooperative bank) at 
the same location. Since they both must use hard information, they both offer loans to 
good firms with probability one. As described in Proposition 3, the probability that the 
Austrian bank makes an offer to firms with a good signal is equal to one in the region 
closest to the border. The further away the firm is, the lower is the probability that the 
Austrian bank makes an offer.  
 
4. Testable Hypotheses  
We want to study the effect of cross-border lending on the firm’s access to loans and the 
role of distance in cross-border lending. Ideally, we would use data on individual loans, 
which, however, cannot be observed. Instead, we measure the cross-border lending by 
Austrian banks indirectly by the perception of German firms of the banks’ lending 
13 
behavior. In Proposition 3 this has been captured by the probability F(RdX) that banks 
offer loans at all.
12
  
 
Hypothesis 1: Up to a certain distance, the closer a firm is located to a bank in Austria, 
the more likely it perceives bank lending behavior to be accommodating. 
 
Without cross-border lending, we expect that access to loans is more difficult for 
firms in the border region. As long as foreign banks do not lend to firms, firms can get 
loans only from the few domestic banks in the border region. The entry of Austrian 
banks increased the availability of loans for firms in the border region. Thus, our 
proposition implies that otherwise identical firms will perceive the bank’s lending 
behavior with a higher probability as accommodating if they are located closer to the 
Austrian border. Distance is often found to be a major determinant of international 
financial flows (see Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004, Buch and Lipponer, 2004, and 
Heuchemer et al., 2008).  
 
Hypothesis 2: The firm’s state of business and its perception of banks’ lending behavior 
are positively correlated.  
However, the state of business of the individual firms should play an important role in 
the banks’ decision on lending. This indicator should capture the usual hard information 
on enterprise performance, but it should also capture soft information. If banks get 
informative signals about a firm’s creditworthiness, the correlation between the 
perception of the banks’ lending behavior and the enterprise’s state of business is 
expected to be positive.  
 
5. Data Description  
The ifo Business Climate Survey provides a unique source of information on perception 
of the bank’s lending behavior by German manufacturing firms. It became available for 
                                                 
12 Note that this probability is different from the probability that an individual firm receives a loan after 
its application was evaluated. 
14 
research only very recently and therefore has hardly been used in the literature. The 
surveys are available on a semiannual base (March and August) from August 2003 to 
August 2006.
13
 Firms are asked: “How do you assess the readiness of the banks to 
provide loans to enterprises?” The possible answers include restrictive, normal and 
accommodating.
 
A specific point of the question is that the first two choices are possibly 
not mutually exclusive.
14
 In particular, restrictive and normal are likely to represent a 
joint category. This can be especially important for Germany with a long tradition of 
conservative lending policy, which was perceived positively by the population. 
Therefore, we comprise the answers as two categories, namely accommodating versus 
non-accommodating (which is normal and restrictive). The appropriateness of this 
approach is also tested in Appendix C.  
Furthermore, we use information on the business development of firms surveyed. In 
this respect, we concentrate on the major part of the survey, which is concerned with the 
state of business of the responding firms. Similarly to the previous case, the answers 
include bad (coded as 1 in the data set), satisfying (2), and good (3). The response rate 
to both questions is generally very high. 
The ifo survey also provides a number of qualitative indicators which specify the 
firm’s economic situation in more detail. These contain, for example, the stock of 
orders, and the assessment of the previous developments as well as expected ones. The 
data show a high correlation between the assessment of the current state of business and 
the previous expectations. Therefore, we only included the current state of business, 
which also performed the best in the regression analysis. This result is similar to 
findings by Westermann (2007).  
As a further control for the regional business development we use unemployment 
rates. These reflect regional developments very well and are available on a very 
disaggregated level. Monthly data on regional unemployment for about 140 districts in 
Bavaria and Baden-Wuertemberg is taken from the German Federal Employment Office 
(BA, 2008). 
                                                 
13 In August 2003 this question was asked for the first time.  
14 We appreciate a comment by Natalja Menold from the Centre for Survey Research and Methodology 
on this point.  
15 
In our further analysis, we focus on the states of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg 
because they are in the closest proximity to Austria.
15
 We also restrict our sample to 
firms with less than 500 employees because we want to focus on SMEs. This provides 
us with about 4,500 observations. Figure 2 shows the development of financial 
conditions and the state of business for our sample of SMEs in Bavaria and Baden-
Wuerttemberg.  
Unfortunately, we do not have information about which banks a firm has a business 
relationship with, because this goes beyond the survey’s scope. With only few 
exceptions, all firms have the possibility of contacting at least one bank which is located 
directly in their municipality. The majority of firms are located in municipalities with 
two or more financial institutions. The number of banks should not influence the 
perception of the financial conditions. Moreover, according to our model, the lending 
policy of German banks does not depend on the distance to the Austrian border. 
To proxy for the firm’s opportunity to get a loan from an Austrian bank, we include 
the great circle distance to about 50 selected communities with at least one bank office 
in Austria. We use the shortest distance to a financial institution in Austria for each 
firm. This measure of distance ranges between 14 km and about 300 km.  
 
                                                 
15 Baden-Wuerttemberg does not have a direct border with Austria, but it is located at Lake Constance 
(Bodensee), which represents the border between Austria and Germany.  
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Figure 2: Financial Access and Business Climate in Bavaria and Baden-
Wuerttemberg  
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Note: Business climate is defined as the share of firms assessing their state of business as good less the 
share assessing it as bad. Only manufacturing firms with less than 500 employees are included.  
Source: ifo Institute, own calculations.  
 
6. Cross-Border Lending and Firm’s Perception of Banks’ Lending Behavior 
We estimate several specifications of linear probability models (OLS), as well as probit 
and logit models, for the assessment of individual enterprises in Bavaria and Baden-
Wuerttemberg concerning the lending behavior of banks between August 2003 and 
August 2006. Our dependent variable is the conditional probability, c, that a firm i at 
time t assesses the banks’ lending behavior as accommodating.  
On the right-hand side, we use firms’ assessment of their state of business, , 
distance, , regional unemployment rate by districts indexed by r, u
ib
id rt, and a vector of 
additional control variables, , including dummies for the size of the firms and time 
effects (that is, the period of the biennial surveys) with the corresponding coefficient 
vector Ȗ. Time effects reflect all time specific factors including e.g. business cycles as 
discussed by Blum and Hellwig (1995), refinancing costs, or regulatory differences in 
both countries. Thus, we can specify the model as  
itZ
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1 ,  (2) 
where iH  is the error term with the standard statistical properties (i.i.d.).  
Table 1 reports OLS, logit, and probit estimation of (2).
16
 Both hypotheses are 
confirmed for all specifications. The evaluation of the firm’s own state of business is 
positively correlated with the assessment of the perception of the banks’ lending 
behavior. Thus, enterprises with a good state of business seem to also have better access 
to loans. In turn, the banks are efficient in selecting enterprises with positive 
development and provide them the necessary financial means.
17
  
Distance has negative effects on the perception of the banks’ lending behavior. The 
estimated effects may appear to be relatively small at first glance. However, the 
differences in the distance between the firms are also large. The marginal probability 
estimates of the probit specification indicate that each ten kilometers of distance to the 
Austrian border lower the probability of the firms viewing the credit supply as 
accommodating by 0.1 percentage points.  
Distance could also capture regional developments in Germany if they vary with 
distance to Austria. We control for regional development by regional unemployment 
rates because these have the advantage of being available on a very detailed level. We 
find that unemployment has no effect on the firm’s perception of the banks’ lending 
behavior.  
Furthermore, the regression largely confirms the stylized facts of the loan supply in 
the period analyzed. The coefficients of time dummies show that the perception of the 
banks’ lending behavior has been continuously improving during this time. The 
differences between financial supervision in Germany and in Austria were reduced in 
May 2005, when the threshold values above which banks must provide information 
about the credit worthiness of the borrowers to the supervisory authority were unified. 
Actually, the time dummy of 2006 is no longer significant, although this is most likely 
also caused by the economic upturn in Germany.  
                                                 
16 Below, we consistently report marginal probability effects for probit estimations in our paper.  
17 However, there is a possible endogeneity problem as firms with access to loans may also face better 
economic prospects. The results remain largely unchanged if we use alternative variables (e.g. orders) 
with fewer endogeneity problems.  
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Somewhat surprisingly, the medium-size enterprises (between 50 and 1999 
employees) seem to assess the credit supply as more accommodating than the smaller 
(below 50 employees) and larger (200 to 499 employees, which represent the base 
group) enterprises.  
We applied several sensitivity tests to our results.
18
 First, we use time-specific 
coefficients for the distance to Austria, which might reflect the changes in the regulatory 
requirements during the period analyzed. We do not find any significant changes of 
distance effects during the analyzed period, while the pattern of time effects is also 
confirmed by further sensitivity analysis in Appendix B. Second, we include dummies 
for Munich and the major cities in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. Surprisingly, the 
effects of the cities are less important than we expected. Third, we replace state of 
business with firms’ expectations for their commercial operations. The results prove the 
overall stability of our findings, which may reflect correlation between state of business 
and expectations. If both variables are included in estimations, only state of business 
remains significant.  
                                                 
18 The results of sensitivity analyses described below are available upon request from authors.  
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 Table 1: Financial Access and Distance in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, 
August 2003 – August 2006 
Variable OLS Logit ProbitA
State of business 0.050*** 0.863*** 0.040*** 
Distance (in 100 km)  -0.011** -0.194** -0.010** 
Regional Unemployment  -0.001 -0.020 -0.001 
Year 2003:08 -0.104*** -2.101*** -0.055*** 
Year 2004:03 -0.097*** -1.648*** -0.050*** 
Year 2004:08 -0.087*** -1.196*** -0.041*** 
Year 2005:03 -0.068*** -0.764*** -0.031*** 
Year 2005:08 -0.043** -0.354* -0.017** 
Year 2006:03 -0.013 -0.055 -0.003 
Size (1-49 employees) 0.015 0.302 0.015 
Size (50-199 employees) 0.026*** 0.499*** 0.023*** 
Constant  0.041* -3.635***  
Number of observations  4319 4319 4319 
Note: A - Probit coefficients report changes in the probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous 
explanatory variables and a discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. ***, **, and * denote 
significance (using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors) at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, 
respectively. 
 
7. Robustness Analysis – Threshold Effects  
The previous analysis looked at a relatively large region with firms being located up to 
approximately 300 km away from the Austrian border. However, it is rather unlikely 
that firms and banks are in direct contact at distances close to the upper level of the 
interval. The effects of distance may diminish after a threshold is reached. However, 
any a priori selection of the sub-sample would be questionable. While 300 km 
represents a possible upper bound of significant effects, we should analyze whether the 
effects are stable over this interval. Hansen (2000) proposes the threshold model for 
such situations, which can be stated as  
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Figure 3: Identification of Threshold  
 
Threshold Estimate (km):  99.131 
LM-test for no threshold:  31.314 
Bootstrap p-Value:  0.008 
Note: Number of bootstrap replication was 1000, the trimming equals 15%. 
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where į is the threshold level of the distance. We can rewrite the model in one 
estimation equation with a dummy variable, D(į), which equals 1 for distance below the 
analyzed level of possible threshold, į, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the model takes the form  
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,  (4) 
where ș1 = ȕ3 + ȕ5 and ș2 = ȕ5. In our empirical application, we expect that ș1 is 
negative and larger in absolute value than ș2, which may be no longer significantly 
different from zero.  
The threshold level, į, is unobservable. Hansen (2000) shows that it can be 
estimated by the regression which yields the lowest sum of the squared errors for all 
possible levels of the threshold. Furthermore, we can test whether the threshold is 
significantly different from zero by the heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange 
21 
multiplier (LM) test for a threshold for coefficient ȕ4. The level of threshold is selected 
by the LM statistics yielding the highest particular statistics in Figure 3. We also report 
bootstrap p-values using 15 per cent trimming shares and 1000 replications. For the 
identification of the threshold, we estimate a linear probability model, while Table 2 
also presents the estimations for logit and probit.
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Table 2: Distance Threshold Effects in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, August 
2003 – August 2006, Answer “Accommodating”  
Variable OLS Logit ProbitA
State of business 0.050*** 0.873*** 0.041*** 
Distance (in 100 km)  -0.021*** -0.368*** -0.018*** 
Distance less than Threshold (99 km) -0.044*** -0.745** -0.034** 
Regional Unemployment  -0.000 -0.013 -0.001 
Year 2003:08 -0.104*** -2.103*** -0.054*** 
Year 2004:03 -0.097*** -1.648*** -0.049*** 
Year 2004:08 -0.088*** -1.202*** -0.041*** 
Year 2005:03 -0.068*** -0.779*** -0.031*** 
Year 2005:08 -0.043** -0.355* -0.017* 
Year 2006:03 -0.014 -0.072 -0.003 
Size (1-49 employees) 0.014 0.285 0.014 
Size (50-199 employees) 0.026*** 0.487*** 0.023*** 
Constant  0.060** -3.333***  
Number of observations  4319 4319 4319 
Note: A - Probit coefficients report changes in the probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous 
explanatory variables and a discrete changes in the probability for dummy variables. ***, **, and * 
denote significance (using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors) at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per 
cent, respectively. 
 
Figure 3 shows the results of threshold tests applied sequentially for the linear 
probability models. If the dependent variable is defined for firms viewing the lending 
policy as accommodating, the Hanson’s LM test identifies a threshold level of distance 
at 99 km, which is significant at 5% level. Table 2 reports the estimation results. We can 
                                                 
19 Sequential Chow tests following Stock and Watson (2006), that we used in the robustness analysis, 
estimate the same threshold level using linear probability models and logit and probit models.  
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see that the marginal effects of distance on the probability that a firm views the credit 
supply as accommodating is relatively high (0.034 for probit model), in addition to the 
distance effects found for the whole sample (0.018). Both effects are also highly 
significant. The tests reject a second threshold for the distance variable, while no 
differences throughout the sample are found for state of business.  
 
8. Conclusions  
We started this paper with the observation that financial integration in Europe is low in 
relationship lending and retail banking. However, the fragmentation of these markets 
should not be too surprising given that the borrowers are opaque SMEs. Because there 
are significant problems of asymmetric information, distance therefore plays an 
important role.  
We investigate this situation in a theoretical model in which, due to regulatory 
requirements, the German bank must use hard and verifiable information which is 
perfect (and thus is independent of the distance between bank and firm). In contrast, the 
Austrian bank bases its creditworthiness test on soft information, the precision of which 
decreases with distance. In such a situation the Austrian bank possesses less information 
about applicants than the German bank and therefore faces an adverse selection 
problem. Consequently, the Austrian bank does not offer loans with certainty and the 
probability that it offers loans at all decreases as a firm is located further away from the 
Austrian border. Indeed, our data show that German firms that are located closer to the 
Austrian border are more likely to perceive the banks’ willingness to lend as 
accommodating. Thus, our first result is that German firms benefit from cross-border 
lending by easier access to loans. 
As a second result we show that distance matters for cross-border lending, as well. 
We can therefore argue that cross-border lending plays an important role for financial 
integration. Banks located in the neighboring country can grant loans based on soft 
information up to a certain distance. Therefore, as a mode of integration, cross-border 
lending might be more favorable to SMEs than cross-border mergers. And, through 
cross-border lending, foreign banks might serve markets that have been neglected by 
merged banks or other domestic banks.  
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In our case of the German-Austrian border, the German banks were rather reluctant 
to lend during the first five years of the decade. This reluctance was particularly 
pronounced for SMEs. Among the explanations is the implementation of Basel II. And, 
indeed, it seems that there is a major difference between German and Austrian banks 
because particularly small and regional Austrian banks have not yet adopted Basel II 
(Jäger and Redak, 2006). Furthermore, up to May 2005 there was also an explicit 
difference between supervision regulations in the two countries. We interpret the initial 
difference in “regulations on the books” as one example for the differences that exist in 
the general in the design and implementation of the supervision in Austria and 
Germany. Thus, differences in bank regulations may provide incentives for cross-border 
lending. 
The German-Austrian border has some special characteristics that foster cross-
border lending because both countries share a common language and legal origin. 
However, there are many borders in Europe which share these characteristics. There is, 
for example, also anecdotal evidence about German banks lending to Danish firms. 
Thus, this form of integration seems to take place without there being much attention 
paid to it. 
The trade literature suggests that trade in goods (in our case services) is often 
followed by foreign direct investment (FDI). Thus, cross-border lending might only be 
the first step towards bottom-up integration. Very recently, we have observed that 
Austrian banks founded new subsidiaries in the border regions of Germany and Italy, 
which favors this argument. This certainly indicates that integration is taking place on 
many layers, both at the top through cross-border mergers and also at the bottom. 
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Appendix A: Model of Cross-Border Lending – Proofs  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Suppose that the German bank screens and that the Austrian bank offers loans – based 
on the imperfect signal it obtains – to all firms with a good signal. A firm is indifferent 
between borrowing from a German and an Austrian bank if  
)sp(X-R)p(X-R AG     (A.1) 
We have to determine the repayments offered by the German and the Austrian bank. 
The German bank will grant loans only to good firms. Thus, the German bank’s profit is 
. The minimum repayment necessary to break even is  cǿĮ(p RȆ GG
p
cI
R
G  . The Austrian bank grants loans to those firms with a good signal. Thus, the 
Austrian bank’s profit is  The minimum repayment 
necessary to break even is 
 ǿsĮǿRpsĮȆ AA
   
sp
ssI
R
A
D
DD  11 .  
 
Case 1: Assume )Rsp(X-)Rp(X-
AG  . 
The Austrian bank could marginally undercut the German bank by demanding a 
repayment that is slightly below the equivalent of 
G
R . Then, the German bank makes 
zero expected profits if it offers 
G
R  and does not serve any customers. The Austrian 
bank makes an expected profit of       cssIspXA DDDD  3 1211 . The 
Austrian bank does not have an incentive to demand a lower repayment because it 
would forgo profits. It does not have an incentive to demand a higher repayment either 
because it would lose all the good customers to the German bank and make an expected 
loss from financing the bad firms.  
 
Case 2: Assume )
AG
Rsp(X-)Rp(X- !  
There is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose the German bank offers a repayment 
that is equivalent to İRG  . At this repayment, the Austrian bank would no longer offer 
loans. Given that the Austrian bank does not offer loans, it would be optimal for the 
German bank to demand X. Thus, we next derive the equilibrium in mixed strategies.  
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We start by deriving the offers of the German bank using the fact that the Austrian bank 
must be indifferent between all repayments in the range ),[ XR
A
 and not making an 
offer at all, that is:  
               011111   3 IsIpRsRFIsRF GGA DDD  
As a result,      IpRs
Is
RF G 
 D
D 11
1 . With probability      IpXs
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XF G 
  D
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1  the 
German bank will demand X.  
 
The German bank must be indifferent between all repayments in the range 
  )),(1[ XRsXs A , that is        cIpRRFRF AAG  3 D10 . The expected 
payoff from all repayments must be equal to the repayment the German bank obtains 
when demanding the equivalent of 
A
R , i.e.: 
          cssIXspRsXs AG DDDD  3 111)(1 . 
As a result,        cIpR
cIsXsp
RF A 
 D
DDD 1121
1 . With probability 
       cIpX
cIsXsp
RF A
--
--11-2--1
-1 D
DDD  the Austrian bank does not offer loans. 
          Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Suppose the Austrian bank would invest K to implement a screening technology. Then 
both banks would use hard information. This would drive profits in the credit market 
game down to zero. Thus, the Austrian bank could not recover the fixed costs for 
implementing the credit evaluation technique that uses hard information on German 
firms. Therefore, the Austrian bank does not have an incentive to screen.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The German bank will always make an offer to good firms and never offer loans to bad 
firms, independent of the distance between the bank and the firm or between the 
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Austrian bank and the firm. The Austrian bank does not offer loans with probability 1-
F(X)=
    
 cIpX
cIsXsp
--
--11-2--1
D
DDD
. The partial derivative with respect to s is: 
    
 
   
  0
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.  Q.E.D. 
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Appendix B: Stability Tests  
The cross-border lending as a new phenomenon in the European integration process 
may be expected to change during the period analyzed. Indeed, some incentives for 
cross-border lending may change as a response to changes in banking supervision. In 
particular, section 2 has shown that the threshold value for providing loan information 
to the supervision authority was lower in Germany (EUR 250,000) than in Austria 
(EUR 750,000) until May 2005, when it was unified to the higher threshold value.  
Therefore, we test the stability of the cross-border lending between Austria and 
Germany. In particular, we extend equation (2) by a set of time-specific coefficients of 
distance,  
 ,  (B.1)   itit
k
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where ș stands for time effects such that the parameters Ĳ are estimated for the 
individual surveys, and the remaining variables and parameters are defined as before. 
Although we can see some differences between the surveys (see Table B.1), they are not 
very large. Thus, this sensitivity analysis confirms the results in Tables 1 and 2. The 
stability of the results may correspond to the large similarities between the Austrian and 
the German legal and supervisory frameworks. Furthermore, significant differences in 
the implementation of bank supervision (or “regulation in action”) are still in force, 
despite the recent steps towards policy synchronization. 
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 Table B.1: Sensitivity Analysis – Time-Specific Coefficients for Distance  
 OLS Logit ProbitA
State of business 0.050*** 0.867*** 0.040*** 
Regional Unemployment  -0.001 -0.019 -0.001 
Distance (2003:08)  -0.003 -0.508 -0.020 
Distance (2004:03)  -0.008 -0.349 -0.015 
Distance (2004:08)  -0.024 -0.740** -0.032** 
Distance (2005:03)  0.008 0.183 0.009 
Distance (2005:08)  -0.008 -0.108 -0.005 
Distance (2006:03)  -0.009 -0.083 -0.004 
Distance (2006:08) -0.036** -0.293 -0.017* 
Year 2003:08 -0.157*** -1.822** -0.053*** 
Year 2004:03 -0.142*** -1.573** -0.050*** 
Year 2004:08 -0.107*** -0.591 -0.029 
Year 2005:03 -0.139*** -1.516*** -0.050*** 
Year 2005:08 -0.088** -0.638 -0.029 
Year 2006:03 -0.057 -0.381 -0.020 
Size (1-49 employees) 0.015 0.304 0.014 
Size (50-199 employees) 0.026*** 0.498*** 0.023*** 
Constant 0.082*** -3.498***  
Number of observations  4319 4319 4319 
Note: A – Probit coefficients report changes in the probability for an infinitesimal change in continuous 
explanatory variables and a discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively.  
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Appendix C: Test of the Parallel Regression Assumption 
The answers to both survey questions are ordinal variables ranking either the economic 
situation or the lending policy of the banks. However, the answers “restrictive” and 
“normal” are not mutually exclusive as a restrictive lending behavior of banks can be 
considered to be a normal type of behavior for banks.  
Therefore, we test whether the parallel regression assumption – which shows 
whether the relationship for different answers to our question (that is, restrictive, 
normal, and accommodating) – is the same (see Long and Freese, 2006.). The results of 
an approximate likelihood-ratio test
20
 of whether the coefficients are equal across 
categories are shown in Table C.1. The parallel regression assumption is clearly rejected 
for both logit and probit models. Correspondingly, we cannot use ordinary logit or 
probit model for analysis of perceptions on banks’ lending behavior. Given the possible 
ambiguity on the construction of the question, we concentrate on firms assessing the 
lending behavior as accommodating in the empirical part of our paper.  
 
Table C.1: Test of the Parallel Regression Assumption  
 Logit Probit 
LR Test Statistics (Ȥ2) 46.87 43.13 
p-value  0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 We use commands ‘omodel logit’ and ‘omodel probit’ which are available in stata.  
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